

# Categorically axiomatizing the classical quantifiers

Hyperdoctrines for classical logic

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# The question

When should we consider two proofs in the classical sequent calculus identical

We consider this problem, for the logic with first-order quantifiers, using *categorical proof theory*.

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Consider categories of formulae/proofs in a formal system.

objects = formula

morphisms = (equivalence classes of) derivations

Morphism composition: from  $A \rightarrow B$  and  $B \rightarrow C$  infer  $A \rightarrow C$ .

The equivalence classes of morphisms should characterize a natural notion of equality on proofs.

Prawitz: two ND derivations equal if they have the same  $\beta\eta$ -normal form.

Equational theory of a cartesian-closed category: ccc's give the “model theory” of intuitionistic natural deduction.

Two sequent MLL derivations are identical if (roughly) they have the same cut-free proof net.

Equational theory of a  $*$ -autonomous category (or, equivalently, a *symmetric linearly distributive category with negation*).

Two sequent LK derivations are identical if ?

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Instead, model it as *inequality*.

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A *classical category* is an *order-enriched* category  $\mathcal{C}$  with

- A  $*$ -autonomous structure  $(\mathcal{C}, \wedge, \top, (-)^\perp)$
- Such that the defining adjunction for  $(-)^{\perp}$  is an order-isomorphism
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$$\Delta : A \rightarrow A \wedge A \quad \langle \rangle : A \rightarrow a$$

$$\Delta \circ f \leq (f \otimes f) \circ \Delta$$

$$\langle \rangle \circ f \leq \langle \rangle$$

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There are other non-trivial classical categories, most notably built from sets and relations.

*Interpreting* proofs in such categories give notions of identity on classical proofs.

# Hyperdoctrines – from propositional to first-order logics.

Idea: treat the formulas/proofs over a given set of free variables as a category.

Substitution/quantifiers are functors between these categories.

Key observation (Lawvere): Quantifiers arise as adjoints:

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$$\frac{A \vdash x^* B}{\exists x. A \vdash B}$$



Clear question: what is the notion of hyperdoctrine for classical sequent proofs?

Setting  $\exists x \dashv x^* \dashv \forall x$  rules out certain interpretations of the quantifiers – in particular as infinitary connectives.

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Instead, we can use an “adjunction-up-to-adjunction”, or “lax adjunction”...

$$\frac{A \vdash x^* B}{\exists x. A \vdash B} \leq$$

$$\varepsilon : \exists x(x^* A) \rightarrow A \quad \eta : A \rightarrow x^*(\exists x A)$$

$$f \circ \varepsilon \leq \varepsilon \circ \exists x(x^* f) \quad \text{and} \quad x^*(\exists x g) \circ \eta \leq \eta \circ g.$$

We call a morphism “strong” if these diagrams commute.

# Interpreting the quantifier rules

$$\frac{\Gamma, A \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \exists x.A \vdash \Delta} \exists L$$

$$[\Gamma] \wedge \exists x. [A] \rightarrow \exists x. ([x^*\Gamma] \wedge [A]) \rightarrow \exists x. ([x^*\Delta]) \rightarrow [\Delta]$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, \vdash B, \Delta}{\Gamma, \vdash \exists x.B, \Delta} \exists R$$

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## Definition

A *dual doctrine* is a functor  $\mathcal{C} : \mathcal{B}^{op} \rightarrow \text{Cat}$  such that

- $\mathcal{B}$  has finite products.
- $\mathcal{C}(X)$  is a classical category, for each  $X$ .
- For each  $f$  a morphism in  $\mathcal{B}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}(f)$  ( $= f^*$ ) is strong monoidal with respect to  $\wedge$ .
- For each projection  $\pi$  in  $\mathcal{B}$ , there is a right *lax* adjoint  $\forall_{\pi}$ , which is a symmetric monoidal functor, such that the adjunction is symmetric monoidal.
- The *Beck-Chevally condition*
- The existence of *Prenex strengths*
- The *switch morphism* is strong.

**Prenex strengths** The morphism

$$\mathbf{Prenex}^\circ = \mu_{A, x^*B} \circ (\mathbf{id} \otimes \eta) : \forall x A \vee B \rightarrow \forall x (A \vee x^*B)$$

has a right adjoint **Prenex** such that

$$\mathbf{Prenex}^\circ \circ \mathbf{Prenex} \leq \mathbf{id}$$

and

$$\mathbf{Prenex} \circ \mathbf{Prenex}^\circ = \mathbf{id}$$

Let  $A \vee B$  be defined as  $(A^\perp \wedge B^\perp)^\perp$

Then, in every  $*$ -autonomous category, there is a morphism

$$A \wedge (B \vee C) \rightarrow (A \wedge B) \vee C$$

called “weak/linear distributivity” (Cockett/Seely) or “switch” (Guglielmi, Lamarche, Strassburger).

Plays a key role in interpreting the cut rule. We require it to be *strong*.

We can construct a term classical category from sequent proofs in LK, by interpreting cut elimination as an inequality and then forming a quotient of proofs by an (unfortunately rather complicated) equivalence relation.

## Theorem

*Interpretation of proofs in a classical doctrine is sound w.r.t. cut-elimination: if  $\Phi$  cut-reduces to  $\Psi$  then*

$$[\Phi] \leq [\Psi]$$

An alternative formulation of classical categories takes the switch as basic rather than the  $*$ -autonomous structure. Duality is not built in, so we can axiomatize the duality of the two quantifiers (not automatic, since the adjunctions are only “up to adjunction”).

Finding concrete examples!

- We have non-syntactic example, built from families of sets and relations using an abstract Gal construction (Abramsky's Int construction).
- This at least shows the axioms do not imply collapse...
- But more would be nice!
- In particular, examples where the quantifiers arise as genuine adjoints.

First-order versions of other notions of model for classical proofs.



Thank you for your attention.